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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BARBARA CROUSE 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
HUMAN RESOURCES CONSULTING 
GROUP, INC., a Utah corporation, and 
ROBERT J. THURSTON. 
Defendants /Appellants. 
Case No. 950119-CA 
Argument Priority 15 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§78-2a-3(2)(k). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions which are determinative 
a the issues raised in this appeal. 
STATEMENT Or RELEVANT TACTS 
1. In February 1988, Crouse was contacted by Thurston regarding 
providing services for HRCG for which Crouse would be paid a yearly wage plus 
1 
medical insurance. Crouse would also be reimbursed for all expenses associated 
with the services provided.1 
2. On or about January 15, 1989, Crouse and HRCG entered into a 
written agreement whereby Crouse was to perform consulting services and 
demonstrations on behalf of HRCG.2 
3. Crouse performed consulting services and demonstrations on behalf 
of HRCG up until about November 1989.3 
4. In November 1989, Thurston directed Crouse to perform customer 
support work. This made it such that Crouse could not leave the office to perform 
demonstrations. Crouse continued performing customer support work for HRCG 
up until October 1990.4 
5. During the time period in which Crouse was performing customer 
support services, Crouse felt that she was not being properly compensated. At the 
request of Thurston, Crouse prepared and submitted billings wherein Crouse 
believed she was owed approximately $48,600 from HRCG.5 
1
 Crouse T. 10 - 12. Finding of Fact 11 4. 
2
 Crouse T. 13. Thurston T. 98 - 99. Ex. #2. Finding of Fact 11 5. 
3
 Crouse T. 1 4 - 16. Thurston T. 1333. Finding of Fact 11 6. 
4
 Crouse T. 16, 48, 64. Thurston T. 133. Finding of Fact 11 11 8 - 10. 
5
 Crouse T. 17 - 18. Ex. #3 - #8. Finding of Fact U 11. 
2 
6. HRCG responded to these billings on or about October 2, 1990, 
questioning some of the invoices submitted by Crouse. HRCG presented a 
proposal for payment for Crouse's services performed.6 
7. HRCG, on or about October 4, 1990, provided an accounting 
breakdown as to HRCG's position along with an offer of $24,661.62 as payment 
for Grouse's services performed.7 
8. Shortly thereafter, Crouse and Thurston met to discuss the settlement 
proposal using the October 4, 1990, letter as a beginning point. During this 
meeting, Thurston made handwritten changes to the October 4, 1990, letter 
changing the ofifer to $28,911.62 for Crouse's services performed.8 
9. On or about October 18, 1990, Crouse wrote a letter to HRCG 
indicating that she was in agreement with the modifications made to the October 
4, 1990, as discussed, except for paragraph 8c.9 
10. Shortly thereafter, Crouse and Thurston met again to discuss 
paragraph 8c. In this meeting, Thurston agreed to pay Crouse an additional 
$5,625 from paragraph 8c. Thurston handwrote $5,625 below the previous ofifer, 
6
 Crouse T. 19, 37. Thurston T. 105. Ex. #9. Finding of Fact f 12. 
7
 Crouse T. 20. Thurston T. 107. Finding of Fact 11 13. 
8
 Crouse T. 20 - 22. Thurston T. 106 - 108, 136 - 137. Ex. #10. Finding 
of Fact If 14. 
9
 Crouse T. 23 - 25. Thurston T. 137. Ex. #12. Finding of Fact 11 15. 
3 
and Thurston handwrote $34,536.62 at the bottom of the page. Crouse accepted 
this settlement offer of $34,536.62.10 
11. On or about October 25, 1990, HRCG paid to Crouse $14,000 of the 
agreed to settlement amount. HRCG did not make any more payments on the 
balance of $20,536.62 owing.11 
SUMMARY Qr THE ARGUMENT 
HRCG in its brief, has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the 
challenged finding, and fails to show that the evidence does not support the 
finding of the trial court. Instead, on all issues, HRCG has merely selected those 
facts from trial that are most favorable to its position, and then reargues those 
facts to this court on appeal. Accordingly, HRCGfs appeal should be dismissed. 
HRCG argues in its brief that there is no evidence to support the trial 
court's finding of fact that an agreement was reached between the parties. Crouse 
presented credible evidence in testimony and documentation which supports the 
trial court 's finding of fact. The policy of the appellate courts of Utah is to not 
disturb a verdict on a factual question which is supported by any competent 
evidence. Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
10
 Crouse T. 26 - 27, 45, 73, 94. Thurston T. 138 - 139. Ex. #13. Finding 
of Fact 11 16. 
11
 Crouse T. 27 - 28, 34 - 36, 46. Thurston T. 139. Ex. #14. Finding of 
Fact 1111 17, 20. 
4 
credibility of the witnesses. The findings must be so lacking in support that they 
are against the clear weight of the evidence, thus clearly erroneous. In order to 
challenge the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must first marshal the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in 
the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support 
the findings. HRCG has not met this high burden, and there is sufficient evidence 
to support the finding of the trial court. 
The trial court properly applied the facts in this case to the appropriate legal 
principles in concluding that an agreement was reached to resolve the dispute 
between Crouse and HRCG. The evidence presented demonstrates that the 
required contract elements were present in the agreement. This is supported by 
written documents and oral testimony found in the record. Furthermore, HRCG's 
partial performance in satisfaction of the agreement removes any alleged 
requirement that the agreement be signed by the parties. Also, the evidence of 
Crouse compromising her claim and relinquishing her rights to the additional 
sums to which she believed she was owed clearly qualifies as consideration for the 
settlement agreement. Accordingly, the settlement agreement is enforceable as 
found by the trial court and HRCGfs appeal must fall. 
5 
ARQUMENT 
POINT I 
HRCG HAS NOT PROPERLY MARSHALED THE 
EVIDENCE, AND HAS NOT MET ITS BURDEN OF 
PROOF IN THIS APPEAL. 
HRCG appeals from a judgment entered against it on behalf of Crouse. To 
challenge a finding of fact, HRCG must marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings and then demonstrate that, even when viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, that the evidence is 
nevertheless insufficient to support those finding and therefore "clearly 
erroneous". State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); URCP 52(a). 
HRCG has not in this case properly marshaled all the evidence, let alone in 
the light most favorable to the findings made by the trial court. Rather, HRCG has 
selected specific portions of the evidence that are most favorable to its position, 
even though they are contrary to the findings of the trial court, and neglects to 
refer to the evidence that supports the findings. HRCG is simply rearguing those 
facts that were asserted and rejected by the trial court. The appellate courts are 
not permitted to weigh the evidence de novo. In re Estate of BartelL 776 P.2d 885 
(Utah 1989). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated in reference to an appellants failure to 
marshal the evidence: 
If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court 
assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court and 
6 
proceeds to review the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of 
law and the application of the law in the case. 
Saunders v, Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) 
HRCG, by failing to properly marshal the evidence, ignores the rules designated 
to give stability to the rulings of the trial court. 
HRCG must also demonstrate that the finding of the court are against the 
clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. In re Estate 
ofBartell. 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) furthermore stands for the proposition 
that: 
Whether the facts have been found by a jury or a judge, appellants 
should recognize that the burden of overturning factual findings is a 
heavy one, reflective of the fact that we do not sit to retry cases 
submitted on disputed facts. 
HRCG has not met this heavy burden of demonstrating that the findings of the 
trial court are clearly erroneous, but appears to be doing exactly that which the 
appellate courts are not prepared to do, that is, retry the case on disputed fact. 
HRCG, as is more fully set forth in the individual arguments below, has not 
met its heavy burden for marshaling the evidence, showing that trial court's 
findings are so lacking that they are against the clear weight of the evidence, or 
demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion. As such, HRCG has not 
properly followed appellate requirements and the rulings by the trial court should 
be affirmed. 
7 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL SUPPORTS 
THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT HRCG ENTERED 
INTO A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH CROUSE 
In Point I of Appellant's Brief. HRCG challenges the trial court's Finding of 
Fact No. 16 which reads as follows: 
Shortly thereafter, [Crouse] and [HRCG] met again to discuss 
paragraph 8c. In this meeting, [HRCG] agreed to pay [Crouse] an 
additional $5,625 from paragraph 8c. [HRCG] handwrote $5,625 
below the previous offer, and [HRCG] handwrote $34,536.62 at the 
bottom of the page. [Crouse] accepted this settlement offer of 
$34,536.62.12 
When challenging a trial court's finding of fact, the appellant must marshal 
all the evidence supporting the finding that is being challenged. Alta Industries 
Limited v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). After marshaling all the 
evidence, the appellant must then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial 
court 's finding is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of 
evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. Wade v. Stangl. 869 P.2d 9, 12 
(Utah App. 1994). HRCG in its brief fails to meet this heavy burden. 
As background to assist the court in understanding the context of Finding 
of Fact 11 16, a brief summary of the facts leading up to the events set forth in that 
Finding is provided. Crouse began working for HRCG in 1988 performing 
demonstrations, sales, and installations on behalf of HRCG.13 In January 1989, 
12
 Findings of Fact H 16. R. 62. 
13
 Crouse T. 10 - 12. Finding of Fact 11 4. 
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a contract was signed regarding the services Crouse would provide to HRCG and 
the compensation she would be paid for said services on a commission basis,14 
There came a time, however, when HRCG needed someone to perform its customer 
support, Mr, Thurston, president of HRCG, directed Crouse to perform the 
customer support services for HRCG. These duties prevented Crouse from 
continuing to perform demonstrations, sales and installations along with their 
related commissions.15 
Accordingly, there came a time when Crouse and HRCG began to discuss 
what compensation Crouse was to be paid for her services for HRCG during the 
time she was performing customer support. At the request of HRCG, Crouse 
submitted billings to HRCG in the amount $48,680.44. This was Crouse's 
accounting of the compensation to which she believed she was entitled.16 HRCG 
acknowledged it owed compensation to Crouse for her services, but questioned 
some of her billings. After exchanging letters and meeting on one occasion to 
discuss the various items in the letters, the parties compromised or agreed all of 
the items leaving except paragraph 8c.17 (The status of the at this point in time 
is reflected by Exhibit # 10 which is October 4, 1990, as modified by Mr. 
14
 Crouse T. 13. Thurston T. 98 - 99. Ex. #2. Finding of Fact 11 5. 
15
 Crouse T. 16 ,48 ,64 . Thurston T. 133. Finding of Fact 1111 8 -10, 
16
 Crouse T. 17 - 18. Ex. #3 - #8. Finding of Fact K 11. 
17
 Crouse T. 19 - 25. Thurston T. 105 - 108, 136 - 137. Ex. #9, #10, and 
#12. Finding of Fact 1111 12 - 15. 
9 
Thurston's handwriting with a total offer of $28, 911,62,) The next events which 
resulted in an agreement between the parties are reflected in Finding of Fact 11 16 
which is being challenged by HRCG. 
HRCG in its brief does not appear to challenge the first sentence of the 
finding of fact and acknowledges that the parties did meet again to discuss 
paragraph 8c. Both Crouse and Thurston testified that a meeting was held 
wherein the parties discussed paragraph 8c.18 Exhibit #13 further reflects this 
meeting. Therefore, the evidence clearly supports this finding. 
HRCG, however, appears to be asserting in its brief that there is no evidence 
to support the second sentence of the finding, that HRCG agreed to pay Crouse 
an additional $5,625. However, there is ample evidence which supports this 
finding. Crouse testified that she discussed with Thurston why she would not 
accept paragraph 8c as offered. Crouse testified that during this meeting, 
Thurston then agreed to add $5,625 to the previous offer of $28,911.62.19 
From this, and adding further support of the agreement comes the next 
sentence of the finding. HRCG does not appear to directly challenge the third 
sentence of the finding of fact that Thurston, President of HRCG handwrote 
$5,625 below the previous offer, and then wrote $34,536.62 at the bottom of the 
page. Crouse testified that Thurston again, in his own handwriting, modified the 
Crouse T. 26 -27, 45, 73, 94. Thurston T. 138 - 139. Ex. #13. 
Crouse T. 25 - 26, 45, 73, 94. Thurston T. 138 - 139. Ex. #13. 
10 
only remaining item which had yet to be agreed upon in the October 4, 1990. 
letter, that being paragraph 8c.20 These final handwritten modifications are 
contained in Exhibit #13 which was admitted into evidence at trial.21 
The final sentence of this findings indicates that Crouse accepted the offer 
from HRCG in the amount of $34,536.62. Crouse testified that she met with 
Thurston and negotiated a final settlement. Crouse testified that she agreed to 
paragraph 8c in the additional amount of $5,625 for a total settlement of 
$34,536.62 as described on Exhibit #13.22 This became the final agreement 
between the parties. 
After the parties reached this agreement, HRCG indicated that the money 
would be paid as soon as possible. On October 25. 1990. HRCG made its first 
payment on the settlement agreement to Crouse in the amount of $14,000.23 
This partial performance of making a payment to Crouse further evidences that 
HRCG did agree to settlement. 
When making a determination as to facts of a case, the trial court, who is 
the fact finder in this case, weighs the testimony and evidence which is presented. 
As has been previously stated by this Court: 
Crouse T. 26. 45, 73. 
Court T. 32. R. 49. 
Crouse T. 26 - 27. 94. Ex. #13. 
Crouse T. 27 - 28. 46. Thurston T. 139. Ex. #14. 
11 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses. Bailey v. Call. 767 P.2d 138 (Utah App. 1989). 
The Supreme Court has also stated that even though the record may contain 
conflicting evidence, a trial court's finding which is supported by sufficient 
evidence will be upheld. Clair W, Gladys Judd Family Ltd, v, Hutchings, 797 P.2d 
1088, 1090 (Utah 1991). 
In this case, the trial court heard the testimony of Crouse and Thurston and 
received are reviewed documentary evidence. There is no question that there was 
conflicting testimony from these witnesses as to what took place. But it is the role 
of the trial court, who hears the live testimony, to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses in conjunction with the documents submitted into evidence, and 
determine the facts of the case. In so doing, the trial court believed the testimony 
of Crouse. 
HRCG in its brief simply reasserts the same argument that it presented at 
trial. HRCG contends that because the trial court did not chose to believe the 
testimony of Thurston, means that the findings are not justified under the law. 
The trial court may choose to believe one witness over another when there is a 
conflict in evidence. In re Estate of BartelL 776 P.2d. 885 (Utah 1989). Despite 
the fact that HRCG may not agree with the trial courts rulings, the trial court 
weighed the evidence and found in favor of Crouse. HRCG has not properly 
marshaled the evidence or met its burden of showing the findings to be clearly 
12 
erroneous. In fact, as demonstrated in this argument, the trial court's finding in 
this regard is supported by credible evidence and should not be disturbed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE 
PARTIES ENTERED INTO NEGOTIATIONS TO SETTLE 
A DISPUTED CLAIM RESULTING IN AN ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION. 
HRCG in its brief argues that the January 15, 1990, contract is the 
controlling documents as to the agreement between the parties and the ultimate 
settlement reached and therefore any change to the Agreement must be done in 
writing. This assertion is not supported by the facts and evidence in this case or 
the law. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT WAS PRESENTED WITH ORAL AND 
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH SUPPORT THE FINDING 
THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES AND HRCG S PARTIAL PERFORMANCE OF THE 
AGREEMENT WAIVES ANY CLAIM FOR THE NECESSITY 
FOR ANY FURTHER WRITINGS. 
A dispute arose between HRCG and Crouse as to what compensation 
Crouse would receive for the services she provided between November 1989 and 
October 1990. This resulted in negotiations between the parties and the 
exchanging of various writings which ultimately resulted in an agreement. 
Crouse first provided to HRCG an accounting of her time and expenses 
indicating she was entitled to $48,680.44.24 From this, HRCG reviewed the 
Crouse T. 17 - 18. Ex. #3 - #8. 
13 
billings and invoices and responded by writing a letter to Crouse dated October 
2, 1990.25 HRCG sent a subsequent letter dated October 4, 1990.26 A meeting 
was held between the parties to discuss the offer presented in the October 4, 1990 
letter. This letter became the basis of the negotiations between the parties. 
Handwritten changes to the October 4, 1990 offer were made by Thurston.27 After 
this meeting, Crouse wrote a letter to HRCG indicating her acceptance of 
paragraphs 1 to 7, and paragraphs 8a and 8b as discussed in the meeting. 
However paragraph 8c remained in dispute.28 
Ultimately, a meeting was held to discuss paragraph 8c. It was agreed that 
HRCG would pay Crouse an additional $5,625 for a total of $34,536.62. This is 
confirmed by the handwritten numbers by Thurston on the October 4, 1990.29 
HRCG indicated that it would pay the money as quickly as possible.30 
There is substantial writings prepared by both parties, some of which is 
Thurston's own handwriting, which supports and substantiates that an agreement 
was reached. This alone is enough to support any "writing requirement". 
25
 Crouse T. 19,37. Thurston T. 105. Ex. #9. Finding of Fact 1112. 
26
 Crouse T. 20. Thurston T. 107. Finding of Fact 1113. 
27
 Crouse T. 20 - 22. Thurston T. 106 - 108, 136 - 137. Ex. #10. Finding 
of Fact H14. 
28
 Crouse T. 24 - 25. Thurston T. 137. Ex. #12. Finding of Fact 1115. 
29
 Crouse T. 25 - 27, 45, 73, 94. Thurston T. 138 - 139. Ex. #13. Finding 
of Fact 1116. 
30
 Crouse T. 27. 
14 
Nevertheless, after reaching this agreement, HRCG issued a check in the amount 
of $14,000 as the first payment on the settlement,31 This "part performance" on 
the part of HRCG removes any previous requirement of a writing signed by both 
parties. 
The doctrine of part performance is a well established principle in contract 
law. The part performance by a party acts to manifest its intent to be bound by 
the negotiated agreement even if it was not signed by the parties. In Commercial 
Union Associates v. Clayton. 863 P.2d 29 (Utah App. 1993), this court stated: 
It is axiomatic that a party may become bound through its 
performance to a contract that has not been signed. It is a 
fundamental contract law that the parties may become bound by the 
terms of a contract even though they did not sign the contract, where 
they have otherwise indicated their acceptance of the contract, or led 
the other party to believe that they have accepted the contract. 
This Court also cited law from other jurisdictions in Commercial Union Associates 
which support this principle that it is not always necessary for a parties signature 
to create a binding document. The court went on to state that the assent to the 
contract can be shown by the conduct of the parties. (Citing City and County of 
Denver v, Adolph Poors Co,, 813 F.Supp. 1476, 1480 (D.Colo. 1993).) 
In the case at hand, there is a significant amount of writing which sets forth 
the agreement reached between the parties. HRCG!s argument that the agreement 
is not enforceable because the documents were not signed by the parties, even 
though it made a payment in partial performance of the agreement is contrary to 
31
 Crouse T. 27 - 28, 46. Thurston T. 139. Ex. #14. Finding of Fact 1117. 
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the law. The evidence presented and the applicable law support the trial courts 
ruling that an agreement was reached between the parties, and the agreement is 
binding on both parties. 
B. THE AGREEMENT MEETS ALL NECESSARY CONTRACTUAL 
REQUIREMENTS. 
In the case at hand, the settlement agreement contains all the necessary 
elements to be binding on the parties. Without revisiting again all the facts 
leading up to the final settlement agreement, a brief analysis of the final 
agreement itself indicates that necessary elements have been met. 
As described above in the previous arguments, the October 4, 1990, letter 
provided the basis of the ongoing negotiations. In the final meeting between 
Crouse and Thurston, HRCG ultimately offered to pay Crouse $34,536.62. Crouse 
accepted that offer.32 
HRCG now argues in its brief, however, that there was no consideration for 
the agreement. This is contrary to the evidence and law. Consideration is "the 
inducement to a contract, something of value given in return for performance or 
a promise of performance by another" Barrons. Law Dictionary, (1984). In other 
words, consideration represents the element of bargaining to indicate that each 
party agrees to surrender something in return for what it is to receive. 
Crouse T. 26 - 27. Ex. #13. Finding of Fact 11 16. 
16 
In the case at hand, Grouse performed customer support services for HRCG. 
HRCG received the benefit of those services. Crouse believed she was entitled to 
$48,680.44 for those services.33 HRCG disputed that Crouse was owed that 
much. Therefore, the parties negotiated until they reached a settlement in the 
amount of $34,536.62.34 
From this evidence, it is clear that consideration existed in the final 
settlement. Crouse, in exchange for the $34,536.62 from HRCG, provided 
customer support services for HRCG and relinquished her legal right to her claim 
to the additional $14,143.82 to which she believed she was entitled. This meets 
the element of consideration under the law. Accordingly, the agreement can not 
be invalidated for lack of consideration and the finding of the trial court should 
be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
HRCG in this appeal is attempting to get a second shot at trying this case. 
HRCG principally is rearguing the facts of the case to this Court. The trial court 
heard all the evidence, and after weighing the evidence, found certain witnesses 
and evidence to be more credible than others. The trial court sits in a position to 
make these determinations, and on appeal, the appellate court will only overturn 
33
 Crouse T. 16 - 18. Ex. #3 - #8. Finding of Fact HIT 8 - 11. 
34
 Crouse T. 19 - 27. Ex. #9, #10, #12, and #13. Finding of Fact HH 12 -
16. 
17 
such a ruling if it clearly erroneous. This is a heavy burden which HRCG has not 
met. 
The trial court ruled from the evidence that there arose a dispute between 
the parties as to the amount of compensation Crouse was due. The trial court 
ruled that the parties did enter into negotiations to resolve the dispute. There was 
an offer, acceptance and consideration to support the agreement. An agreement 
was reach in the amount of $34,536.62. The court further ruled that HRCG paid 
$14,000 in partial satisfaction of the agreement and HRCG has breach this 
agreement by failing to pay the remaining balance in the amount of $20,536.62, 
together with interest and costs. 
The Judgment in favor of Crouse by the trial court should be affirmed in all 
respects. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JJ_ day of April, 1995. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
By: 
Brian 
Attorney lor Appelle 
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ADDENDUM 
19 
October 4, 1330 
Ms. Barbara Crcuse 
Comprehensive Benefits Service! 
South Ledgemont Drive 
SLC, UT 
> N^O 
IT f6 oo 
D e a r B a r b : 
Here is rny best efforts of where we stand on expenses: 
OWE BARB 
1. On J&rt 3, 1383 you gave rne an invoice, attached 
1 owed you $30,£30 for consulting and sales 
Recording to your invoice, 1 had paid $14,500 
* * ' " 
BALANCE 
£. From the fol2tV=«wing checks, HftCG had paid for 
Invoices 1-5 Check 5£4, 5/3/8B 667.73, 
Check 1029, 7/£l/88 433.15, Check 433, 9/12/88 
$630 (paid Invoices £,4, 5 ) , Check 1050, 3/£6/88 
$1000 (paid Invoice 3 for $1044) 
3. On March 13, 1983 you gave me invoices 6-l£ 
4. On April 1, 1383, I gave you check #749 for 
BALANCE 
5. On October 1, 1330, you gave rne invoices 13-16 
Question #1 66-88 phone bill not found 
Question #£ OK and approved by Rob 
Question #3 agreed to pay 50% of air 
Question #4 agreed to pay 50% of ca,r rental 
BALANCE 
6. Checks paid from HRCG in 1989- $17,910.41 
l/£6 #7£7 
1/5 
4/£l 
5/£6 #116 
6/£6 167 
8/15 £80 
9/6 £97 
9/£3 141 
BALANCE f PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 13 1 
$.*U, £5u. 00 
(14, 500.00) 
$15,750.00 
0. 00 
£,416.90 
(£,416.90 A/ 
$15,750.00 
3, 043; 07 
( 66.88) 
( 1£9.Q0) -
(*-^ -3(S703T* 
$18,461. 16 . 
.0 
?J 
v> 
\ 
A (£, £12.06) 
(4, 000.00) ^ ) \ 
(£, 000. 00) t> 
( 56£. 77)-l\^^ 
(1, 135.58) 
(5,000.00) 
(1? 500.00) 
(1,500.00) 
550-75 
Page £ 
BALANCE FORWARD 550.75 
7- Checks paid from HRCG in 
1/18/90 #333 
3/££ 41£ 
1990 
<l,£G<f. 13) 
(15,OOO.OO) 
BALANCE (15,713.38) 
Q-^0QilS_SyGGESIED_CQh!PROMlSE/gFFER= 
a- Pay the installation/sales of $8,5uO 
(adjusted for PC89) 
%0td 
b. Credit you for April, June, October, Nov, Dec 
of 1989 and for Jar*, Feb, March, and April of 1990 
for giving two demos each of those months since 
you were busy doing customer support. 9 months at 
$£500/month is $££500. Remaining 1£ months are 
at $1£50 or $15,000. TOTAL OF $37,500. 
c. Reduce onl_y half of the monies by;f30/>/*finee you 
did not sell £ systems in either 1989 or 1990. 50* 
of^$37,500 is $18750 and 30* reduction is <r$56£J*>less 
or $13,1£5. $13,1£5 is added to remaining $16750 for 
a total of $31,875. 3 1 , 8 7 5 . 0 0 
BALANCE DUE E<ARB 
d . 
$ £ 4 , G 6 1 . 6 £ 
3 75^00 
I will pay you $15,000 cash within 5 days of the check^li 1*^ 
clearing from either Bishop Trust or l-IMSA of Hawaii. \SlS&. 
e. Remainder due Barb Crouse will be held in a promissory-^ncrtre 
paying 1E% annual interest only compounded monthly and paid 
annually as of the date this offer is agreed to in writing by 
both parties. HRCG agrees if the bank account of HRCG has more 
than $60,000 after all expenses outstariding, that HRCG will cash 
in promissory note to Barb Crouse. 
I hope you will continue to show the good faith and efforts that 
you have in the past Brtd if you desire to change our Agreement, 
that you will so notify me. I want ^xrtd need your help and 
support. 
Sincerely: 
Rob J. Thurston 
SI 
m 
Third Juaicis* DJCiMt 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA CROUSE, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
HUMAN RESOURCES CONSULTING ] 
GROUP, INC., a Utah corporation, and ] 
ROBERT J. THURSTON, an individual, ; 
Defendants. ] 
1 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) Case No. 920904676 
I find the facts to be as follows. Plaintiff was employed by the defendant 
under an oral agreement on a yearly wage plus medical insurance. On January 15, 1989, 
plaintiff and defendant entered into a written agreement whereby plaintiff was to perform 
consulting services and demonstrations on behalf of defendant. Finding that defendant 
operated under that contract and about November 1989, the defendant asked the plaintiff 
to give customer support services. Plaintiff did, which made it such that she could not 
get out to do demonstrations This lasted until about the end of October 1990. 
Plaintiff felt she was not being properly compensated and submitted to the 
defendant a billing, exhibits 3 - 8 , for a total of approximately $48,600 owed to her. 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 920904676 
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Defendant responded in a letter dated October 7, plaintiffs exhibit 9, which disputed one 
of the billings and made a suggested offer. On October 4, plaintiff further made a written 
offer that has been submitted as plaintiffs exhibits 10, 11, and 13. Plaintiff wrote 
defendant under letter dated October 18, which objected primarily to paragraph 8C of 
defendant's offer. 
I hold there was a meeting between the parties wherein the letter of October 
4, written by the defendant, was used as the basis of their negotiations. Paragraph 8C was 
the basic area of renegotiation. Exhibit 13 shows in dark, bold ink the figure $28,911.62, 
which would indicate that this was the final offer. Written there under is the figure 
$5,675, which was added to it, bringing the final figure to $34,536.62. Defendant admits 
that the bold ink is his writing but denies that he added the $5,675 onto that figure and 
that it is not his writing. In looking at it carefully, it appears that the defendant has an 
unusual way of making the figure "2" that shows up in the bold and also in the final 
figure. I hold that the preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant did 
write that figure and that the final agreed figure was $34,536.62. This end figure being 
negotiated down from the requested $48,600. Defendant agreed to pay $15,000 
immediately and a note to follow. A check for $14,000 was paid. 
I hold there was an agreement between the parties for employment. There 
was a dispute as to compensation. There was a meeting between the parties and an 
accord was reached. That $14,000 was paid in partial satisfaction of that accord. 
Memorandum Decision 
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After plaintiff decided to resign, defendant had a change of heart and then 
made claim for additional amounts that plaintiff owed to him which included some repair 
to equipment, health insurance, etc. Health insurance was never mentioned in the written 
contract. It was granted to plaintiff when she went to work and it just continued. There 
was no mention at any time of any repayment until after the accord and satisfaction. As 
to the claims for the repair on her equipment, I hold this was mutually to his benefit at 
the time, and it was not expected to be repaid. In any event these were matters that he 
had knowledge at the time of the meeting and at the time of reaching the accord. 
I hold for the plaintiff for the balance of the unpaid amount agreed to in 
their accord for $20,536.62, together with interest and costs. 
Plaintiffs counsel to prepare findings, conclusions and judgment in 
accordance with this decision. 
Dated this / Q day of August 1994. 
0 0 0 0 5 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the \l? of August 1994,1 sent a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision to counsel as follows: 
Randy B. Birch 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Christopher A. Tolboe 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MAYBE 
Attorney for Defendants 
124 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
JL 
Deputy Court irt(£lerk * 
0 0 0 i\ Fi r> 
JO 
T(6rm———f Brian J. Babcock, Esq 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
57 West South Temple, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
Third Jui iels! P;c'*fK t 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA CROUSE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HUMAN RESOURCES CONSULTING GROUP, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and 
ROBERT J. THURSTON, an individual, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT [t>"c/^9'i/ 
Case No- 920904676CN 
Judge Ronald O. Hyde 
The subject case came on for trial before the Honorable Ronald 
O. Hyde, sitting without a jury. The trial was held on July 26, 
1994. Plaintiff was represented by Brian J. Babcock, of Walstad & 
Babcock. Defendants were represented by Christopher A. Tolboe, of 
Murphy, Tolboe & Maybe. The Court, having previously made its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby orders: 
1. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff against 
Defendant Human Resources Consulting Group, Inc. in the sum of 
$20,536.62, together with prejudgment interest of $8,050.35 through 
September 25, 1994, with a per diem rate of $5.63 thereafter until 
the date hereof, and costs of $191.00. Interest on the judgment 
shall accrue post-judgment interest at the statutory rate. 
2. The Complaint against Defendant Robert J. Thurston is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
0 0 0 0 5 6 
3. The Counterclaim of Defendant Human Resources Consulting 
Group, Inc. and Defendant Robert J. Thurston is dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED this 3 o day of ^UJlfc 1 9 9 4 
BY THE COURT 
i f?\i>^ £^& 
RONALD 0. HYDE 
District Court Ju 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on this Z[ day of September 1994, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, to Christopher A. Tolboe, 124 South 600 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102. 
BJB\hd:cros-hrc.j ud 
0 0 0 0 5", 
1JOOeEiEMT 
Brian J. Babcock #6172 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Temple View Centre 
57 West South Temple, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 531-7000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA CROUSE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HUMAN RESOURCES CONSULTING 
GROUP, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and ROBERT J. 
THURSTON, an individual 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Brian J. Babcock, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby 
deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law within the 
State of Utah, and I am an associate attorney with the law firm of 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK. 
2. I am familiar with the prevailing rates and costs charged 
by attorneys in the community for services rendered similar to 
T h h x ? . \ -/<wia' P»"^r«*t 
B>. 
SEP 3 0 1S34 
SAL^LAktCol^ tY 
AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS 
Civil No. 920904676CN 
Judge Ronald 0. Hyde 
0 0 0 0 5 b 
those which our fin mi rendered for the Plaintiff in connection wri th 
the above-captioned matter. 
3. "1 In ioilowing is a break «IHH I couli. i inr.iii i t*« I by 
Plaintiff jnnection with the above-entitled matter: 
Service Fee - Summons & Complai nt 
Service Fee - Subpoena 
TOTAL COSTS INCURRED TO DATE: 
0 8 / 2 0 / 9 2 
09. 25, 92 
0 7 / 2 6 * 94 
$ 8 0 . 0 0 
$ 3 4 .50 
:> 7 6 , 5 0 
$ 1 9 1 . 0 0 
DATED tl l i s 2lL day of September Il 994, 
1994. 
BRIAN J./BABCOCK 
SUBSCRIBED / 1 II SWOR I I I 1 N * f c >i e :i • • i 1 :hi s day of September', 
i s. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing i\\ : 
ll ' 
L„. 
dim IMt / k ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS to be mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Christopher A. Tolboe 124 South 600 East, #100, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, this Z/J/" day of September, 1994. 
10 4 7 ex oi use af f 
-2-
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Brian J. Babcock, Esq. (6172) 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
57 West South Temple, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
By-
SEP 3 0 m 
SALT LAKE COUv . Y 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA CROUSE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HUMAN RESOURCES CONSULTING GROUP, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and 
ROBERT J. THURSTON, an individual, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 920904676CN 
Judge Ronald O. Hyde 
The subject case came on for trial before the Honorable Ronald 
O. Hyde, sitting without a jury. The trial was held on July 26, 
1994. Plaintiff was represented by Brian J. Babcock, of Walstad & 
Babcock. Defendants were represented by Christopher A. Tolboe, of 
Murphy, Tolboe & Maybe. The Court having considered the evidence, 
both oral and documentary, presented by the parties and the 
arguments of the respective counsel, the Court now makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is an individual who previously resided in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, and now resides in the State of 
Arizona. 
0 0 0 0 6 0 
Defendant Human Resources Consulting Group, Inc. ("HRCG") 
in <i Utah i r irporatd lr S 
of Utah, 
3 Defendant: Robert J Thurs 1 :o. (tfThurston" ) is ani 
individual residing i i i Sal t Lake Coi n i fcj S ta/te of I J" tat i. 
4 1 February 1988 I Iii]l aintiff was con tacted by I hi irston 
i : = .garding providing services for HRCG for which Plaintiff would be 
reimbursed for all expenses associated witi i the sex vices provided. 
II, or abou t January J 5if 1989,. Plaintiff and HRCG entered 
in 1 II mi 'i i a g r e e m e i :t. I: i; ,i I: ler e b y PJ ad n ti f f \ ras fcc | u»r f n r m 
consulting services and demonstrations on behal f of HRCG. 
I). Plaintiff performed consulting servi ces and 
d e m o n s ! i mil, i o n * in I  i c l i i i I II I HRn i ii| ill: I til ] a t ::: I L I: I I ::: ember 1 9 8 9 . 
I i November 1909, Foxware, a company which was providi ng 
customer support services for HRCG, indicated i t would i 10 longer be 
:::i is Il: Dmer si lppor t ser vd ces. 
November 1989, Thurston directed Plaintiff to gr '• ' 
the office of Foxware and provide the customer
 Sllpp0rt serviuco, 
11 in in in i mi in in in mi i mi in I in in in i in in i mi 
"in fter woi l'i inq in the offices of Foxware for approximately 
one month, Plaintiff moved to the offi ce of HRCG and continued ; 
me x si IJ::: p c :i : t M c: it: Il i:: rit :i i E • ma' ::i = :iii I: E .• i :::1 : I: II i II 
could not leave the office to perform, demonstr atioi is. 
Plaintiff continued perfor ming customer support work for 
Jill , r t o b e i IUll)'0. 
2 
A / i f\ i\ fi .^  
11. During the time period in which Plaintiff was performing 
customer support services, Plaintiff felt that she was not being 
properly compensated. At the request of Thurston, Plaintiff 
prepared and submitted billings wherein Plaintiff believed she was 
owed approximately $48,600 from HRCG. 
12. HRCG responded to these billings on or about October 2, 
1990, questioning some of the invoices submitted by Plaintiff. 
HRCG presented a proposal for payment for Plaintiff's services 
performed. 
13. HRCG, on or about October 4, 1990, provided an accounting 
breakdown as to HRCG's position along with an offer of $24,661.62 
as payment for Plaintiff's services performed. 
14. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff and Thurston met to discuss 
the settlement proposal using the October 4, 1990, letter as a 
beginning point. During this meeting, Thurston made handwritten 
changes to the October 4, 1990, letter changing the offer to 
$28,911.62 for Plaintiff's services performed. 
15. On or about October 18, 1990, Plaintiff wrote a letter to 
HRCG indicating that she was in agreement with the modifications 
made to the October 4, 1990, as discussed, except for paragraph 8c. 
16. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff and Thurston met again to 
discuss paragraph 8c. In this meeting, Thurston agreed to pay 
Plaintiff an additional $5,625 from paragraph 8c. Thurston 
handwrote $5625 below the previous offer, and Thurston handwrote 
$34,536.62 at the bottom of the page. Plaintiff accepted this 
settlement offer of $34,536.62, 
3 
000062 
On o r abifnuL O c t o b e r 2i\ in 1 n 1TRCG p a i d t o P l a i n t i f f 
1 8 . A f t e r g i v i n g w* ^ wi v... «* ra»_ on, HI i ml i n i l , i" I i M I I I H i I 
1 9 9 0 , P l a i n t i f f p r o v i d e d w r i n i f i c a t i o n t o HRCG t h a i .sill to was 
t a n o t h c ompany. 
19 • On o r a b o u t D e c e m b e r I" I, III" I' 111, a 1 Le i 11 no •. 11" 1.1 J t' ino 111 I i 11 II 
b e e n r e a c h e d a n d o n o p a y m e n t made on t h e s e t t l e m e n t , HRCG a t t e m p t e d 
t Il in in 11'(" III'" II I mi in in ill in f II I 1 in 1 1 1 "' • : s u r a n c e a n d e q u i p m e n t r e p a i r s 
previously paid by UJRtX on be . <i.>*. , Lff 
20. HRCG has not made any more payments on the balance of 
$ 2 0 , "in \ h In.
 t\ I mi 
From, t h e f o r e g o i n g F i n d ! r i g s of F a c t , , t h e C o u r t makc.s "the 
f f ) l II I, J lit! II III I I 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 . T l l O l t - 1 Wil" -ilIH »KJT €>OIM*nl 
Plaintiff was to provide services ioi •* -a> 
Plaintiff for the servi ces. 
2 . Tlion..1 cii i use «i ( l i s p u 11; iii; I < i I linn IIIIIIIH MIII I n) I < ' o m p e n s a t : lion 
Plaintiff was entitled to for services performed. 
3. There was negotiation holwoon I ho parties and ultimately 
a n d c c o u l Wri" . i e a c l i e i I iiiiii III m iiiiiii KIIIIII I Il I I *»]f i <>,' 
4. HRCG has paid $14,1)1)0 in paitiaJ satisfaction of that 
accord. 
4 
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5. HRCG has breached said accord by failing to pay the 
outstanding balance, that being $20,536.62, plus interest. 
6. HRCG agreed to pay, and has paid, Plaintiff fs health 
insurance, for which HRCG is not entitled to reimbursement. 
7. HRCG agreed to pay, and has paid, for equipment repairs 
which were to HRCG's benefit, for which HRCG is not entitled to 
reimbursement. 
8. HRCG had knowledge at the time of the settlement 
negotiations and settlement agreement of the facts regarding the 
health insurance costs and equipment repairs such that any alleged 
claim for said items was resolved in the accord. 
9. Plaintiff is entitled to damages against HRCG by reason 
of foregoing breach of the accord in the amount of $20,536.62. 
10. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the foregoing sum at 
the statutory rate of 10% commencing October 25, 1990, until the 
date hereof. 
11. Plaintiff is entitled to its costs incurred in this 
action in the amount of $191.00. 
12. Plaintiff's cause of action against Thurston personally 
is dismissed. 
13. HRCG and Thurston's Counterclaim against Plaintiff is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
14. Plaintiff is entitled to have judgment entered against 
HRCG in the sum of $20,536.62, together with prejudgment interest 
of $8,050.35 through September 25, 1994, with a per diem rate of 
$5.63 thereafter until the date hereof, and costs of $191.00. 
5 
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Interest on the judgment shall accrue post-judgment interest at the 
:i t, a ti 11ory ra tie. 
DATED t h i s J 0 da;;, o l \xj(XlPt , I "lll 1. 
"^ _ &<< 
BY THE COURT 
RONALDOTHYDE 
District Court Jud 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on this 7,1 day of September 1994r 1 caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDING OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be mailed, postage prepaid, to Christopher A. 
Tolboe, 124 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
BJB\hd:cros-hrc.ff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on this day of April, 1995, I 
caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing "Brief of the Appellee" to be 
Inailed, pootcigo propaJd, to: 
Christopher A. Tolboe 
MURPHY, TOLBOE, & MABEY, P.C. 
124 South 600 East, Suite #100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
nu^JtfJte/ 
